Confederate Hyperinflation
From October 1861 to March 1864 price increases averaged 10
percent per month in the states of the Confederacy, putting the Confederate
price index when Lee surrendered at 92 times its prewar base. In the history of
the United States only the hyperinflation of the American Revolution compares in
intensity with the hyperinflation of the Confederacy.
Like the revolutionaries that spearheaded the American Revolution, the
leaders of the Confederacy faced a populace that was in no mood to pay
additional taxes. Southerners felt that the present generation bore the burden
of a war that would primarily benefit future generations, and as much of the
expense as possible should be passed to future generations. Union blockades of
Confederate ports precluded any effort to implement a revenue tariff on imports,
the main source of federal government tax revenue. The Confederate government
enacted a property tax but lacked the machinery to collect it in the face of
uncooperative state governments. By October 1864 tax revenue accounted for less
than 5 percent of all revenue that found its way to the Confederate
treasury.
The Confederacy met with slightly more success in trying to finance public
expenditures with bonds. In May 1861 the Confederate Congress approved a $50
million bond issue. The bond issue faltered on a depressed cotton market that
resulted from the use of cotton as a bargaining chip with European governments
whose recognition the Confederacy needed, leaving angry planters unable or
unwilling to subscribe to bonds on the scale needed. By October 1864 bond sales
had raised less than 30 percent of all revenue that had entered the Confederate
treasury.
The remaining source of revenue was Confederate money. On 9 March 1861 the
Confederate Congress authorized printing notes in an amount not exceeding $1
million, but the Treasury Department over four years printed $15 million of
notes. Treasury employees at the note-signing bureau rose from 72 in July 1862
to 262 in July 1863. As printers, paper,and engravings became scarce, the Confederate government granted
credit for counterfeit bills, which were stamped valid and reissued. From 1 July
1861 to 1 October 1863 the paper money column of the Confederate Treasury ledger
accounted for 68.6 percent of all government revenue.
Surprisingly, private banks in the Confederacy were restrained in the
issuance of bank notes. The uncertainties of war encouraged private banks to
hold large quantities of vault cash, which actually tempered the inflationary
thrust of the excess paper money.
Much of the Confederate currency bore the option to buy interest-bearing
Confederate bonds up to a certain date, after which that option expired. As
inflation gathered force early in 1864 the Confederate Congress enacted a
currency reform that brought a lull in the inflation rate. The reform provided
that all currency in bills greater than $5 could be converted into 4 percent
bonds, dollar for dollar. Currency not converted into bonds by 1 April 1864 had
to be exchanged for new currency at a rate of three for two. Inflation subsided
until December 1864 when the Confederate government again had to turn to the
printing presses.
From the first quarter of 1861 until 1 January 1864 prices in the Confederacy
rose 28-fold while the money supply rose only 11-fold. Prices rose even faster
than the money supply because of wartime disruptions in the supply of goods, and
the phenomenon of velocity. Velocity is the average number of times per year
that a dollar is spent, and in a hyperinflationary environment, recipients of
money rush to spend it before it loses its value. An increase in the velocity of
money has the same effect on the economy as an increase in the money supply.
The experience of the Confederacy shows what happens when the supply of money
exceeds what is demanded by the normal transactions of business and the desire
for liquidity. When the supply of money exceeds the demand, the value of money
falls, meaning it buys less because of price increases.
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